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INTRODUCTION
As the 1 1 0 th Congress begins to flex its atrophied oversight muscle,1
it bears remembering that, in the ongoing debate over who should have the
authority to authorize and oversee foreign intelligence surveillance
2programs, someone must,3 and the existing mechanisms, in particular, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA') 4 and its related
I See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, Senators Press Gonzales on Delay in Getting Court Okay
on Surveillance, USA TODAY, Jan 19, 2007, at 4A; Lara Jakes Jordan, Senators Grill
Gonzales Over Spy Program, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 19, 2007, at 6A;
Tom Brune, Surveillance Questioned: Gonzales, Senate Judiciary Committee Battle Over
Decision by Special Courts, NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 2007, at A26; and Jeff Bliss, Rockefeller
Says He May Subpoena Documents on Spying, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 26, 2007. See
generally Brian Knowlton, Top Democrat seeks wider NSA hearings, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01 /01 /news/policy.php; Shaun
Waterman, Dems Take Over Hill Intel Panels, UPI, Dec. 8, 2006 ("Democrats say ... they
will launch a vigorous push for oversight of some of the most secret and controversial
programs ... employed in the war on terror .... ); and Eric Lichtblau, With Power Set to
Be Split, Wiretaps Re-emerge as Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A28 ("Democrats..
• vowed to investigate the [National Security Agency Terrorist Surveillance Program]
aggressively once they assume power").
2 This public debate has taken place within the context of media disclosures regarding
certain classified operational programs of the National Security Agency ("NSA"),
including the Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") in which certain international calls of
suspected terrorists were being monitored pursuant to presidential authority without
warrants in circumstances that otherwise might implicate the warrant requirements of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), see James Risen & Eric Lichtblau,
Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, and an
alleged program to collect and analyze Call Detail Records (CDRs) from U.S.
telecommunication carriers, see Leslie Cauley, NSA has massive database of Americans'
phone calls, USA TODAY, May 11,2006), at Al. On January 17, 2007, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales informed the chairman and ranking member of the U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary by letter that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC") had issued orders on January 10, 2007 authorizing certain surveillance previously
authorized under the NSA TSP (the "FISC orders"). The letter stated that as a result of
these orders, "any electronic surveillance that was [previously] occurring as part of the
[TSP] will now be conducted subject to the approval of the [FISC]" and, accordingly, that
"the President has determined not to reauthorize the [program] when the current
authorization expires." For the reasons outlined in this article, FISA should be amended to
provide an explicit statutory basis for these orders to address the problems outlined herein.
Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, to Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://fas.org/irp///agency/doj/fisa/agOI 1707.pdf.
3 See Knowlton, supra note I ("[Senator] Schumer [D-NY] said the problem was not
with good-faith efforts to make Americans secure no Democrat opposed that, he said
but with the president's authority to do so unilaterally.").
4 Pub. L. No. 95-511, Title 1, 92 STAT. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-46, & 1861-62). FISA provides a framework for using
electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices to
acquire "foreign intelligence information."
2
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procedures, are no longer adequate and must be updated. The FISA simply
did not anticipate the nature of the current threat to national security from
transnational terrorism, nor did it anticipate the development of global
communication networks or advanced technical methods for intelligence
gathering.
New technologies do not determine human fates, but they do alter
the spectrum of potentialities within which people act.5  This article
examines how technology and certain related developments have enabled
new threats and new response mechanisms that challenge existing policy
constructs and legal procedures in the context of foreign intelligence
surveillance. 6 This article does not argue that these developments justify
abandoning long-held bedrock principles of democratic liberty-nor even
that some new "balance" between security and liberty need be achieved 7 _
rather, it argues that familiar, existing oversight and control mechanisms-
including FISA-or their analogues can be applied in these novel,
technologically-enabled circumstances, but only if the challenges and
opportunities are better understood and the laws and procedures updated to
accommodate needed change.
This article is intended neither as critique nor endorsement of any
particular government surveillance program or action;8 rather, it attempts to
5 ROBERT MCCLINTOCK & K. A. TAIPALE, INSTITUTE FOR LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, EDUCATING AMERICA FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 2 (1994).
6 It is beyond the scope of this article to address how these developments affect other
national security and law enforcement policy, or to address the underlying philosophical or
political issues regarding appropriate social-control mechanisms more generally. However,
these developments take place within an ongoing transformation of modern societies from
a notional Beccarian model of criminal justice based on accountability for deviant actions
after they occur, see generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (1764), to
a Foucauldian model based on authorization, preemption, and general social compliance
through ubiquitous preventative surveillance and control through system constraints. See
generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). In
this emergent model, 'security' is geared not towards traditional policing through arrest and
prosecution but to risk management through surveillance, exchange of information,
auditing, communication, and classification. See generally THE NEW POLITICS OF
SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY (Kevin D. Haggarty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006)
(discussing the collection and analysis of information for social-control).
7 Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the very notion of balance is misleading and
deflects the discourse since implicit in the use of balance as metaphor is that some fulcrum
point exists at which the correct amount of security and liberty can be achieved. However,
liberty and security are not dichotomous rivals to be traded one for the other in some zero
sum game but rather each vital interests to be reconciled, and, thus, dual obligations to be
met. See, e.g., K. A. Taipale, Introduction to Domestic Security and Civil Liberties, in THE
MCGRAW-HILL HOMELAND SECURITY HANDBOOK 1009-12 (David Kamien ed., 2006); and
K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology
of Privacy, and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 123, 126-8 (2004)
(hereinafter, "Frankenstein").
8 In particular, neither of the classified programs referred to in note 2, supra; however,
certain aspects of the TSP are discussed in general terms in Section III, infra.
2006-2007
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highlight certain issues critical to a reasoned debate and democratic
resolution of these issues. Further, this article does not address directly
whether the President currently has inherent or statutory authority to
approve any specific operational program9 nor whether press disclosure of
classified government programs is appropriate or justified. 10
9 Whether the President has inherent or statutory authority to authorize foreign
intelligence surveillance programs, including the TSP, is currently being litigated. See
ACLU v. NSA, No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich., filed Jan. 17, 2006); and Center for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-00313 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 2006); and
Hepting v. AT&T No. C-06-0672-JCS (N.D. Ca., filed Jan. 31, 2006) (class action suit
against AT&T and other telecommunications providers for participating in the NSA
surveillance programs).
On Aug. 17, 2006, the district court in ACLU v. NSA ruled that the TSP was illegal
under FISA and unconstitutional under the First and Fourth Amendments. That opinion
has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Federal court strikes down NSA
domestic surveillance program, Balkinization (Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/08/federal-court-strikes-down-nsa.html ("much of the
opinion is disappointing, and ... a bit confused"); and Editorial, A Judicial Misfire, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at A20 (The decision "is neither careful nor scholarly" and "as a
piece of judicial work that is, as a guide to what the law requires and how it either
restrains or permits the NSA's program [the] opinion will not be helpful"). On Oct. 4,
2006, a unanimous three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stayed the district court's ruling while the government's appeal is considered. On
Jan. 24, 2007, the Justice Department asked that the case be dismissed as moot. See Dan
Eggen, Dismissal of Lawsuit Against Warrantless Wiretaps Sought, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,
2007, at A5 ("A lawsuit challenging the legality of the National Security Agency's
warrantless surveillance program should be thrown out because the government is now
conducting the wiretaps under the authority of a secret intelligence court, according to
court papers filed by the Justice Department yesterday"). See Government's Supplemental
Submission Discussing the Implications of the Intervening FISA Court Orders of Jan. 10,
2007 at 8-15, ACLU v. NSA, No. 06-CV-10204, (submission filed Jan. 24, 2007). On Jan.
31, 2007, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments on
these issues. See Adam Liptak, Judges Weigh Arguments In U.S. Eavesdropping Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,2007, at A]2.
Testifying in 1976 that the President must retain some Constitutional power to
conduct surveillance beyond FISA despite the "exclusivity" provision set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(f) ("...procedures in ... the [FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which
[foreign intelligence] electronic surveillance ... may be conducted"), President Gerald
Ford's Attorney General Edward Levi asserted that there is "a presidential [surveillance]
power which cannot be limited, no matter what Congress says." Levi, a well-respected
constitutional scholar and formerly the dean of the University of Chicago Law School,
testified that "[t]he very nature of the reserved presidential power, the reason it is so
important, is that some kind of emergency could arise which I cannot foresee now, nor,
with due deference to Congress, do I believe Congress can foresee." Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1976, Hearing on S. 743, S. 1888 and S. 3197, before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
94th Cong., 17-18 (1976) (testimony of Edward H. Levi, Attorney General) quoted in John
Schmidt, When Terrorists Talk... , LEGALTIMES, Sep. 18, 2006 (discussing the exclusivity
provision of FISA and the President's inherent surveillance power). In particular, Levi
warned "that the unpredictability of foreign threats to the nation and the likelihood of
ongoing changes in communication technologies made it 'extraordinarily dangerous' to ...
4
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This article is organized into six parts: this Introduction, four
descriptive sections, and a brief Conclusion. Section L Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance: A Brief Overview provides a very brief introduction to the
relevant parts of the FISA regime; Section II. Changing Base Conditions
describes the changing nature of the threat, the shift to preemptive strategies
in response, and the need for surveillance to support preemption; Section
III: The Ear of Dionysus describes the nature of modern communication
networks and certain related technology developments, and examines how
three situations-transit intercepts, collateral intercepts, and automated
monitoring-cannot be accommodated by FISA as currently constituted
(this section also briefly speculates on certain aspects of the TSP); and,
Section IV. Fixing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance suggests some
potential solutions that preserve existing Fourth Amendment principles and
protections while still addressing these failures. Finally, the Conclusion
not acknowledge the president's retained surveillance power" Id. (emphasis added). While
I take no position in this article on whether, indeed, the President retains inherent
surveillance powers, I do believe that the issues discussed herein are among those kinds of
unforeseen circumstances that Levi foreshadowed.
10 For example, on June 23, 2006, The New York Times disclosed another secret
program that allegedly "trac[ed] transactions of people suspected of having ties to Al
Qaeda by reviewing records [of wire transfers] from [the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication ("Swift")] ... a Belgian cooperative that routes about $6
trillion daily between banks, brokerages, stock exchanges and other institutions." Eric
Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 23, 2006, at Al. Subsequently, The Aew York Times Public Editor Byron Calame
published a mea culpa in which he wrote "I don't think the [Swift] article should have been
published" because the program was clearly legal under U.S. law and there were no
allegations that any information had been misused. Byron Calame, Banking data: A Mea
Culpa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at A12. However, according to then House Intelligence
Committee Chairman Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), "The mea culpa of the Yew York Times public
editor comes too late to stop the damage done to one of our nation's leading tools to track,
understand and prevent the money transfers that enable terrorist attacks." Press Release,
Hoekstra Statement on New York Times Mea Culpa, Oct. 25, 2006, available at
http://hoekstra.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID-51935; see also
Editorial, Not So Swift, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A16 ("The [N.Y.] Times never
adequately defended its exposure of the program ... if no illegality or immoral action has
taken place, and there is a very high risk of genuinely endangering national security, the
decision must be against publication ... sometimes the media simply needs to let
government do its job").
For consideration of whether The New York Times violated the Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. § 798 (2000) (Disclosure of classified information), when it disclosed the TSP, see
Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the "New York Times" Violated the Espionage Act?
COMMENTARY, March 2006, at 23 ("The real question ... is whether ... we as a nation can
afford to permit the reporters and editors of [the New York Times] to become the unelected
authority that determines for all of us what is a legitimate secret and what is not. ... The
laws governing [the disclosure of the TSP by the Times] are perfectly clear, will they be
enforced?" Id. at 31). See also Digital Age with James C. Goodale: "Will Bush Indict The
New York Times?" (WNYE-PBS television broadcast, Mar. 4, 2007).
2006-2007
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reiterates the need to get beyond backward looking recriminations and to
craft progressive consensual solutions.
I. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Of relevance to the discussion in this Article,11 FISA generally
prescribes procedures requiring a court order for conducting electronic
surveillance to gather "foreign intelligence information"'1 2 when such
surveillance targets United States persons 3 or is conducted within the
United States.14  FISA was never intended to apply to wholly foreign
communications of non-U.S. persons nor to be triggered by incidental
interceptions of U.S. person communications during legitimate foreign
intelligence intercepts not themselves subject to FISA.1 5  However, as
11 This article concerns itself with certain specific aspects of electronic surveillance in
particular the interception of 'signals of interest' in packet-based communication
networks and the related technology and policy developments. Thus, it is beyond the
scope of this article to fully delineate FISA and the related foreign intelligence surveillance
law. For a detailed discussion of FISA, see ELIZABETH B. BAZEN, THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS, (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No.
RL30465, 2007).
12 "Foreign intelligence information" is information that "relates to, and if concerning a
United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against (A)
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power or (B) international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power .. " 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2000).
13 "United States person" means a U.S. citizen or lawfully resident alien. 50 U.S.C. §
1801 (i) (2000).
14 "Electronic surveillance" means
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication
sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States
person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by
intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or
from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party
thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000)
15 Communications of a U.S. person acquired during or incidental to a lawful foreign
collection would generally be subject to minimization procedures consistent with Exec.
Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note, and
related guideline documents. Part 2.3 (c) of the executive order would permit retention and
dissemination of "information obtained in the course of a lawful ... international terrorism
investigation" subject only to normal minimization requirements. See note 54 infra and
accompanying text. Cf note 91 infra (discussing restrictions in practice that prevent
6
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/4
9 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 128
discussed in Section III below, technical developments unanticipated by
FISA are triggering warrant requirements in circumstances that were not
contemplated or intended when FISA was enacted.16
Further, FISA is intended to provide a statutory mechanism to
authorize electronic surveillance of U.S. persons or within the U.S. when
there is probable cause to believe the target is an "agent of a foreign
effective use in certain circumstances of incidental intercepts of U.S. person
communications). Executive Order 12,333 allows the collection, retention, or
dissemination of information about U.S. persons pursuant to procedures established by the
head of each intelligence agency and approved by the Attorney General.
The [Central Intelligence Agency] procedures are embodied in
Headquarters Regulation (H.R.) 7-1 entitled, "Law and Policy
Governing the Conduct of Intelligence Activities." NSA is governed by
Department of Defense Directive 5240.1 -R, "DoD Activities that May
Affect U.S. Persons," including a classified appendix particularized for
NSA [see partially declassified Annex Classified Annex to DoD
Procedures under Executive Order 12,333 to NSA/CSS POLICY 1-23
(Mar. 11, 2004)]. The guidelines are further enunciated within NSA
through an internal directive, [NSA/Central Security Services] U.S.
Signals Intelligence Directive 18 [Jul. 27, 1993, hereinafter "USSID
18"]. The FBI procedures are contained in "Attorney General
Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations" [Mar. 1999] [these guidelines were
updated and revised in Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National
Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (effective
Oct. 31,2003)].
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CONDUCTING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (2000), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html.
16 For example, when wholly foreign communications are targeted from a
telecommunications switch in the United States and a communication "to or from the U.S."
is incidentally intercepted, thus, implicating 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2), see the discussion of
transit and collateral intercepts in Section III, infra. And see notes 41 and 49 infra. Note
that any implied warrant requirement in these circumstances is only a statutory requirement
as there is no general Fourth Amendment requirement for a warrant for incidental
collection from a lawful intercept. Even under the stricter provisions governing ordinary
criminal electronic surveillance under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2521, incidental interception of a non-targeted person's conversations during an
otherwise lawful surveillance would not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1985); and United States v. Tortorello,
480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973). Indeed, absent the FISA statute, there may be no general
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for any foreign intelligence surveillance. See, e.g.,
United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); see also United
States v. United States District Court [Keith], 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972) (warrant
required for domestic security electronic surveillance, but Court explicitly disclaims any
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power,' 17 thus, is useful for monitoring known agents of an enemy power.
FISA did attempt to address the then nascent threat of international
terrorism by defining "foreign power" to include "a group engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore" for purposes of
the statute. 18 However, for reasons discussed in Section II, the nature of
the current global terrorist threat does not easily conform to "agent of a
foreign power" equivalence for these purposes.
Finally, FISA provides only a single cumbersome binary mechanism
that requires an individual application to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC") for authorization to target a specific individual
or communication to or from the United States based on anpre hoc showing
of probable cause that the target is acting as an agent of a foreign power or
foreign terrorist group, 19 but provides no mechanisms for authorizing
17 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
18 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2000). However, the prevailing paradigm of 'international
terrorism' at the time that FISA was enacted generally consisted of isolated attacks
conducted abroad against U.S. national interests. See also note 34 supra.
The definition of "agent of a foreign power" was further stretched in 2003 to include
so-called "lone wolves." §1801(b)(1)(C). (The 'lone wolf amendment is often referred to
as the "Moussaoui fix." See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Charles E. Schumer,
Schumer, Kyl to Introduce Moussaoui-fix, Jun. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PRO 1025.htm
1.
19 In the case of a U.S. person, FISA requires probable cause to believe that the target is
an "agent of a foreign power," 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) and that the person's activities "involve
or are about to involve" a violation of the criminal laws of the United States, §
1801 (b)(2)(B); or are activities in preparation for sabotage or "international terrorism" on
behalf of a foreign power, § 1801 (b)(2)(C).
A court order authorizing electronic surveillance to target a specific person or
communication for foreign intelligence purposes is sought under 50 U.S.C. § 1804 by
application of a federal officer in writing on oath or affirmation to a FISC judge after
approval by the Attorney General based upon his finding that the criteria and requirements
set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. have been met. Section 1804(a) sets out specifically
what must be included in the application and § 1805(a) sets out the findings and probable
cause standards required of the FISC judge. Finally, § 1805(c) sets out the limitations that
must be specified in the order.
In addition to the inflexibility of the FISA warrant procedures to accommodate the
circumstances described later in this article, the efficacy of requiring traditional warrants in
all cases for foreign intelligence surveillance was itself questioned by then Attorney
General Edward Levi in 1975:
Levi said ... [f]oreign intelligence ... may in some situations require
"virtually continuous surveillance, which by its nature does not have
specifically predetermined targets." In these situations, "the efficiency of
a warrant requirement would be minimal."
John Schmidt, A Historical Solution to the Bush Spying Issue, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 12, 2006.
See also Hearing on Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) before
the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (2006)
(testimony of Judge Richard A. Posner) (questioning the relevance of the warrant
requirement to certain aspects of foreign intelligence surveillance).
8
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advanced technical methods (including those discussed in this article) to
help identify such agents in the first place.
II. CHANGING BASE CONDITIONS
Both security and liberty today function within a changing
technological context, but mere recognition of changed circumstance itself
is not sufficiently determinative of desirable outcomes. It is acceptable
neither to say that 'everything changed on 9/11' and thus we must accept
lessened liberty, nor to say that we have 'faced greater threats before' and
thus we should cling to outmoded praxis developed at another time, to deal
with a different threat.20 Rather, changing context requires reflective
reexamination of previously satisfactory practices based on an informed
appreciation of the complex interactions of new threats with new
opportunities, and with a willingness to reconstruct outmoded habitudes.
While we cannot simply abandon cherished values because maintaining
them is difficult, neither can we simply resist change because it is
uncomforting.
A. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT AND THE SHIFT TO
PREEMPTION
Enabled in part by force-multiplying technologies, the potential to
initiate catastrophic outcomes to national security is devolving from other
nation states (the traditional target of national security power) to organized
20 Thus, it is particularly delusive to believe that because we successfully faced a
greater destructive threat from the Soviet Union that we can also successfully meet the
current threat with the same outdated strategies or tools, that is, without adapting to change.
It is the qualitative nature of the current threat, not just its quantitative force that needs to
be considered in devising successful counterstrategies. For example, accountability
strategies useful for countering nation state adversaries for example, pursuing nuclear
deterrence through a doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) must be recognized
as ineffective against attackers unconstrained by after-the-fact punishment, in particular,
suicide attackers without accountable patrons or other support infrastructure subject to
sanction or retaliation. Even previously successful counterinsurgency strategies for
example, providing participatory political opportunities will likely be ineffective against
an enemy inherently opposed to rule through democratic structures. So, too, law
enforcement strategies developed to deal with organized crime or other economically
motivated conspiracies like drug smuggling are inadequate when employed against
ideologically motivated forces. For a discussion of strategic counterterrorism options, see
generally BARD E. O'NEILL, INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM (2d. ed., rev'd, 2005); DANIEL
BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR
AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT (2005). For a discussion of defensive strategies
for homeland security, see generally MICHAEL D'ARCY, ET AL., PROTECTING THE
HOMELAND 2006/2007 (2006). For a discussion of the role of the U.S. intelligence system
in counterterrorism, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM (2006).
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but stateless groups (the traditional target of law enforcement power)
blurring the previously clear demarcation between reactive law enforcement
2 1policies and preemptive national security strategies. Organized groups of
non-state actors now have the potential capacity 22 and capability2 3 to inflict
the kind of destructive outcomes that can threaten national survival by
undermining the public confidence that maintains the economic and
political systems in modern Western democracies.24 In simple terms, the
threat to national security is no longer confined only to other nation states.
25
21 See generally Taipale, Frankenstein, supra note 7 at 129-35; and K. A. Taipale,
Designing Technical Systems to Support Policy: Enterprise Architecture, Policy
Appliances, and Civil Liberties, in EMERGENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND
ENABLING POLICIES FOR COUNTER TERRORISM 442-43 (Robert Popp & John Yen eds., Jun.
2006).
22 Technologically-enabled capacities include the use of so-called weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), including chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons, the use
of airliners or other advanced technology infrastructure as a weapon system, or the
targeting of technological vulnerabilities, for example, critical infrastructure control
systems (in particular, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems or SCADA). See,
e.g., Alan Joch, Terrorists Brandish Tech Sword, Too, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK, Aug.
28, 2006.
23 Technologically-enabled capabilities include world-wide recruitment, organization,
funding, planning, training, targeting, and command-and-control using global
communication networks and the Internet. See, e.g., Joch, supra note 22. In addition,
these developments allow direct access to, or circumvention of, mainstream information
distribution channels for propaganda purposes. For an overview of terrorist use of the
Internet, see generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA,
THE NEW CHALLENGES (2006) (see, in particular, the discussion of communicative uses of
the Internet at 49-110; and instrumental uses at 111-46).
24 In addition to the approximately 3,000 immediate deaths resulting from the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the attack has been variously estimated to
have caused between $50 billion and $100 billion in direct economic loss. Estimates of
indirect losses in the immediate aftermath exceeded $500 billion nationwide. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, GAO-02-700R, REVIEW OF STUDIES OF THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE WORLD
TRADE CENTER (2002). In the eighteen months following the attacks, 2.5 million jobs were
estimated to have been lost in the United States. Brian Sullivan, Job Losses Since 911
Attacks Top 2.5 Million, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 25, 2003. The total cost of knock-on
effects, including the cost to national economic efficiency, competitiveness, and civil
liberties from policies implemented in the response to the attacks are incalculable.
25 Indeed, technology is affording non-state competitors including international
terrorist groups, organized crime gangs, rogue multinational corporations, and other hostile
NGOs the potential to exercise economic, political, and military power, including
violence, at a scale that has traditionally been subject to sovereign nation state monopoly
and which is beyond the reach of any single nation state's jurisdiction to control, thus
potentially undermining the entire Westphalian construct of international political relations.
However, it is beyond the scope of this article to address these broader issues. See
generally MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE 377-94 (1999)
("Technology Goes International").
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As Thomas Friedman writes in The World is Flat, 21 st Century terrorism is
the globalization of 20th Century terrorism.
6
Thus, there has emerged a political consensus, at least with regard to
certain threats, to take a preemptive rather than reactive approach 7
"Terrorism cannot be treated as a reactive law enforcement issue, in which
we wait until after the bad guys pull the trigger before we stop them.,
28
The policy debate, then, is not about preemption itself-even the most
strident civil libertarians concede the need to identify and stop terrorists
before they act29-- but instead revolves around what methods are to be
properly employed in this endeavor.
B. THE NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE
Preemption of terrorist attacks that can occur at any place and any
time requires information useful to anticipate and counter future events-
that is, it requires actionable intelligence. 30 Since terrorist attacks at scales
26 THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2006). Globalized transnational terrorism,
enabled and empowered in part by technology developments, see notes 22 & 23 supra, is
simply qualitatively different than the then nascent "international terrorism" threat that was
belatedly addressed in FISA by simply expanding the definition of "foreign power" to
include "group[s] engaged in international terrorism" 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2000); see
also note 18 supra and note 34 infra. See generally NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL
INSURGENCY (Robert J. Bunker ed., 2005) (assessing the threat posed by global terrorism).
27 It is beyond the scope of this article to delineate precisely where the line should be
drawn between threats requiring a preemptive approach and those that remain amenable to
traditional reactive law enforcement. For purposes of this article, we assume that there is
some threat from loosely organized global terrorist groups that implicates national security
and therefore requires a preemptive approach. See, e.g., Osama Bin Laden, Declaration of
War against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (1996), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa 1996.html; Osama Bin Laden,
et al., Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement (1998),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. However, it is not
appropriate, nor realistic, to assume that all manner of 'terrorist' acts are subject to
preemptive strategies or are preventable. It is axiomatic that national security assets,
including foreign intelligence surveillance capabilities, should be employed only against
true threats to national security and not used for general law enforcement or other social-
control purposes.
28 Editorial, The Limits of Hindsight, WALL ST. J., Jul. 28, 2003, at A10. See also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SHIFTING FROM PROSECUTION TO PREVENTION,
REDESIGNING THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS OF TERRORISM (2002).
29 See, e.g., Hearing on Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of
Government Data Mining Programs before U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary)
("We all agree on the need for strong powers to investigate terrorism [and] prevent future
attacks .... ).
30 Terrorism, by indiscriminately targeting civilians and infrastructure, limits the
effectiveness of certain other counterstrategies that are otherwise useful, i.e., those useful
against nation state adversaries conforming to the international laws of armed conflict
2006-2007
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that can actually endanger national security generally still require some
form of organization, and organization requires communication, effective
counterterrorism strategies in part require the surveillance or analysis of
communications to uncover evidence of organization, relationships, or other
relevant indicia indicative or predictive of potential threats-actionable
intelligence-so that additional law enforcement or security resources can
then be allocated to such threats preemptively to prevent attacks.
31
As with the notion of preemption generally, even the most strident
critics of any particular surveillance practice concede the legitimate need for
surveillance to monitor the communications of terrorists to stop them before
they can act.32 Again the contentious issue is what rules ought govern such
surveillance-and who should have the authority to authorize it and with
what oversight. Unfortunately, while FISA "retains value as a framework
for monitoring the communications of known terrorists,... it is hopeless as
a framework for detecting terrorists. [FISA] requires that surveillance be
conducted pursuant to warrants based on probable cause to believe that the
target of surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate need is to find out
who is a terrorist. ' 33  "FISA was built for long-term coverage against
known agents of an enemy power," but the current need is to employ
technical means to help "detect and prevent" future terrorist activity.
34
(LOAC). For example, an effective defensive strategy against a state adversary might
include hardening military targets. However, except in specific contexts such as
reinforcing and locking cockpit doors, one cannot harden all potential terrorist targets, not
even the high value ones. "The nation could never sufficiently harden all potential targets
against attack ...... MARKLE FOUNDATION, SECOND REPORT OF THE MARKLE TASK
FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: CREATING A TRUSTED
NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2003) (arguing for improved information sharing
in order to identify terrorists before they act).
31 Nation-threatening levels of destruction or disruption can generally only be achieved
with highly coordinated conventional attacks, multidimensional assaults calculated to
magnify the disruption, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear (CBN) weapons.
These methods of attack are still likely to need the kind of organization that requires the
use of communications for coordination of action or resource allocation thus providing
opportunities for potential discovery or surveillance.
32 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Seeking Edge In Spy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006,
at Al ("'We all support surveillance . . . .' [Senator John] Kerry said."); Statement
Released by U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Feb. 15, 2006, ("We all agree that we should be
wiretapping al Qaeda terrorists . . ").
33 Richard A. Posner, Commentary: A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2006, at A16.
34 Statement by Gen. Michael Hayden, White House Press Briefing by Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for
National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005). FISA was enacted to provide a statutory framework
for the use of electronic surveillance within the United States of adversary nation state
("foreign power") espionage activities. See generally, e.g., Hearing on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act H.R. 12750 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the U. S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1976). Although FISA defines "group[s] engaged
12
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C. THE DISSOLVING PERIMETER OF DEFENSE
The final characteristic of the current terrorist threat to be considered
in this section is that the perimeter of effective defense is dissolving. The
traditional "line at the border" based defense, useful against threats from
other nation states, is insufficient against a parlous enemy 35 that moves
easily across borders and hides among the general population, taking
advantage of open societies to mask its own organization and activities.
36
Thus, arbitrary national boundary-based rules for conducting electronic
surveillance-like those in FISA that are triggered by activity "within the
United States" or involving "U.S. persons"-that do not conform to actual
patterns of global terrorist activity (and which may have been perfectly
adequate in prior contexts with known or identifiable adversaries) are
deficient to deal with ambiguous threats.
in international terrorism" as "foreign powers" for purposes of the statute, 50 U.S.C. §
1801(a)(4) (2006), it simply did not contemplate the nature or scale of a globalized, non-
state group conspiracy enabled by modern technology that could directly attack the U.S.
homeland or generally threaten long-term national security, nor did it anticipate the need to
use advanced technical methods to help identify and preempt such threats.
For a brief overview of the nature of modern terrorism see WEIMANN, supra note 23
at 20-23. In particular, see the discussion contrasting an intentionally oversimplified
dichotomy of "old" and "new" terrorism, id. at 22, for which Weimann cites Shabtai
Shavit, Contending with International Terrorism, 6 J. INT'L SECURITY AFF. 63-75 (2004)
(proposing a permanent international mechanism to combat terrorism. Id. at 73-75).
35 See bin Laden, supra note 27, and World Islamic Front Statement, supra note 27.
See also Nassir bin Hamd al-Fahd, Risalahfi hokum istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamel
didh al-kuffar (May 2003) (fatwa on the permissibility of WMD in jihad) cited in Robert
Wesley, Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy After the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan, TERRORISM
MONITOR, Vol. 3 Iss. 20, Oct. 21, 2005; CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, AL QAEDA:
STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY (Congressional Research Service Report to
Congress No. RL32759, 2007); ANONYMOUS, THROUGH OUR ENEMIES EYES at xii (2002)
("The United States is embroiled in a momentous struggle .... bin Laden ... and ... the
movement he established is a foe that must be understood before his movement can be, and
must be, defeated and eliminated").
36 Although there is an ongoing global conspiracy hostile to U.S. interests with an
identifiable core, the threat has metastasized to more autonomous and decentralized
organizational structures creating additional challenges for security services. See, e.g., The
Changing Face of Terror: A Post 911 Assessment, Testimony Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations by Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counter-
terrorism, (Jun. 13, 2006) available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2006/CrumptonTestimonyO60613.pdf. See
generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK (2005) ("Individuals
who hitherto had no significant ties to radical organizations are enlisting themselves in the
struggle and committing acts of violence, sometimes without any support from existing
networks." (emphasis added) id. at xiii.) See also ANONYMOUS, supra note 35 at xii ("[T]he
United States can no longer rely on its continental breadth, friendly neighbors, and broad
oceanic shores to insulate it from [terrorist attack].").
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As described below, these challenges are particularly acute for
electronic surveillance in global communications systems where rules based
on geographically-determined jurisdiction and the physical location of
information infrastructure to be targeted are undermined by the global
nature of the infrastructure and information flows, and rules based on
indeterminate or arbitrary 37 attributes, such as citizenship, are technically
impossible to enforce.
III. THE EAR OF DIONYSUS
The Ear of Dionysus (L'Orecchio di Dionigi) is the name given by
the belligerently Baroque painter Caravaggio (1571-1610)38 to a cave in
Syracuse in which, legend has it, Dionysus39 took advantage of the perfect
natural acoustics that allowed eavesdropping on all conversations from one
central spot.40 Ear of Dionysius has come to generically refer to any
structure in which the acoustic architecture naturally allows conversations
to be heard surreptitiously at a distance-so, too, then, the global
communication infrastructure.
A. FISA IS INADEQUATE
In addition to the general challenges detailed in the earlier section
relating to preemption and the changed nature of the threat, FISA is
inadequate as currently constituted in particular because it did not anticipate
the development of global communication networks or advanced technical
methods for intelligence gathering. Thus, it fails in practice to
accommodate three specific circumstances:
37 Here we mean arbitrary in a technical sense, that is, these attributes are unrelated to,
or not obvious from, the data itself.
38 Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio (b. Sep. 29, 1571 d. Jul. 18, 1610) was an
Italian artist considered the first great representative of the Baroque school. That he was
belligerent is evidenced by a contemporary source: "[A]fter two weeks of work
[Caravaggio] will sally forth for two months together with his rapier at his side and his
servant-boy after him, going from one tennis court to another, always ready to argue or
fight, so that he is impossible to get along with." CAREL VAN MANDER, HET SCHILDER-
BOEK (1604), translated in HOWARD HIBBARD, CARAVAGGIO 344 (1985).
39 Dionysus, the bastard son of Zeus and the mortal Semele, was the mythic god of
fertility, wine, intoxication, and creative ecstasy. It was Dionysus who granted Midas the
golden touch, then was benignant enough to relieve him of the power when it proved
inconvenient. See generally ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS AT 103-110, 281-282
(1960).
40 Dorte Zbikowski, The Listening Ear: Phenomena of Acoustic Surveillance in CTRL
[SPACE]: RHETORICS OF SURVEILLANCE FROM BENTHAM TO BIG BROTHER 38 (Thomas Y.
Levin, et al. eds., 2002).
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* First, because FISA has been interpreted by some to require a warrant
for any electronic surveillance that "occurs in the United States" if there
is a substantial likelihood of intercepting contents of a communication
"to or from a person in the United States" it unnecessarily constrains
surveillance of wholly foreign communications-say a phone call
between an al Qa'ida safe house in Pakistan and a known terrorist
financier in Indonesia-if the interception is physically accomplished at
a telecommunications switch on U.S. soil while the communication is in
transit ("transit intercepts").41
* Second, FISA provides a cumbersome binary mechanism requiring
individual application to the FISA court for authorization to target a
specific U.S. person or source based on showing probable cause of a
connection to a foreign power or terrorist organization prior to any
electronic surveillance, even in circumstances where collateral
intercepts incidental to an authorized foreign intelligence target not
subject to FISA might indicate reasonable suspicion that would require
follow up surveillance or investigation to determine whether probable
cause exists ("collateral intercepts"),42 and
* Third, FISA does not provide any mechanism for programmatic pre-
approval of technical methods like automated data analysis or filtering
that may be the very method necessary for uncovering the connection to
a foreign terrorist organization or activity in the first place ("automated
analysis").
41 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (f)(2) (2006); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Domestic
Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A6:
One issue of concern to the [FISC] ... is whether the court has legal
authority over calls outside the United States that happen to pass through
American-based telephonic "switches."
Now that foreign calls were being routed through switches on American
soil, some judges and law enforcement officials regarded eavesdropping
on those calls as a possible violation of those decades-old restrictions,
including the [FISA], which requires court-approved warrants for
domestic surveillance.
see also note 42 infra.
42 There is also a narrower but related problem where the incidental interception of
international calls to or from the United States by a foreign surveillance target not normally
subject to FISA are themselves viewed as triggering the warrant requirements of 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(f)(2) when the interception is physically conducted from a switch in (thus, "occurs
in") the U.S. It is believed that this was among the initial problems with FISA that lead to
the Presidential authorization of the TSP, see infra text accompanying notes 54-61.
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To understand why FISA is inadequate in these circumstances
requires in part an understanding of the nature of modern communications
networks.
B. TRANSIT INTERCEPTS: FROM CIRCUIT-BASED TO PACKET-BASED
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
The fundamental architecture of modern communications networks
has changed significantly since FISA was enacted requiring new methods to
conduct electronic surveillance. These developments challenge existing
constructs underlying electronic surveillance law and policy.
Thirty years ago when FISA was being drafted it made sense to
speak exclusively about the interception of a targeted
communication-one in which there were usually two known ends
and a dedicated ("circuit-based") communication channel that
could be "tapped." In modern networks, however, data and ...
[digital] voice communications are broken up into discrete packets
that travel along independent routes between point of origin and
destination where these fragments are then reassembled into the
original whole message. Not only is there no longer a dedicated
circuit, but individual packets from the same communication may
take completely different paths to their destination.43
43 K. A. Taipale, Whispering Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SECURITY, NO. VII SUPL. BULL. ON
L. & SEC.: THE NSA AND THE WAR ON TERROR (Spring 2006) (hereinafter "Whispering
Wires") available at http://whisperingwires.info. The NSA itself has described these
developments:
In the past, NSA operated in a mostly analog world of point-to-point
communications carried along discrete, dedicated voice channels ...
Now, communications are mostly digital, carry billions of bits of data,
and contain voice, data and multimedia. They are dynamically routed,
globally networked and pass over traditional communications means such
as microwave or satellite less and less. Today, there are fiber optic and
high-speed wire-line networks and most importantly, an emerging
wireless environment that includes cellular phones, Personal Digital
Assistants and computers. ... The volumes and routing of data make
finding and processing nuggets of intelligence information more difficult.
... The volume, velocity and variety of information today demands [sic] a
fresh approach to the way NSA has traditionally done business.... NSA's
existing authorities were crafted for the world of the mid to late 2 0th
Century, not for the 2 1st Century ... [Because of this new]
communications environment ... availability of critical foreign
intelligence information will mean gaining access in new places and in
new ways.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY & CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, TRANSITION 2001 at 31-32
(Dec. 2000), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/nsa25.pdf.
16
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/4
9 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 128
In these "packet-based" networks, computerized switches
("routers") determine in real time and at various points along the way the
most efficient route for ongoing packet traffic to take depending on current
availability and congestion on the network, not simply on the shortest
distance between two points. "Such random global route selection means
that the switches carrying calls from Cleveland to Chicago, for example,
may also be carrying calls from Islamabad to Jakarta.",4 4 To intercept these
kinds of communications, filters ("packet-sniffers")
45 and search strategies 46
are deployed at various communication nodes (i.e., switches) to scan and
filter all passing traffic with the hope of finding and extracting those
packets of interest and reassembling them into a coherent message. Even
targeting a specific message from a known sender may require scanning and
filtering the entire communication flow at multiple nodes.
47
44 JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 50 (2006)
45 A packet sniffer (a network diagnostic tool also known as a network analyzer) is
computer software or hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital
network or part of a network. As data travels over the monitored network segment, the
sniffer can log each packet: an unfiltered sniffer captures all passing traffic and a filtered
sniffer captures only those packets containing a specified data element. Captured packets
must then be decoded, analyzed, and reassembled into a coherent message. For a readable
technical discussion of sniffers, see SUMIT DHAR, SNIFFERS: BASICS AND DETECTION [v.
1.0-1] (2002), available at http://www.rootshell.be/-dhar/downloads/Sniffers.pdf.
46 Because packets that are part of the same communication can travel different routes,
or because their point of origin or destination can be masked using certain proxy routing
techniques, search strategies covering multiple nodes (or covering multiple entry and exit
points on proxy networks) may be needed to effectively intercept any particular
communication. For a general discussion of proxy routing, including "mix networks" such
as TOR that use "onion routing," see, Marc Rennhard & Bernhard Plattner, Practical
Anonymity for the Masses with Afix-Networks, WETICE 255 (Twelfth International
Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, 2003).
47 A familiar example of a packet sniffing application for electronic surveillance was
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's DCS-1000 application for lawful intercepts of email
traffic (aka "Carnivore") (the FBI no longer uses DCS-1000, relying instead on
commercial applications and the in house capabilities of Internet service providers for
lawful intercepts). The DCS-1000 was intended to scan email traffic and only pick out and
log material that was authorized under the particular search warrant pursuant to which it
was being employed. See Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, Testimony of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 6, 2000). Although certain details of the DCS-
1000 remain classified, declassified documents describe a single-purpose Windows
2000/NT computer employing the DragonWare software suite, including: Carnivore, an
analytic filter packet sniffer to capture packets; Packeteer, an application to reassemble
packets into coherent messages, and Coolminer, an analytic tool to help analyze the
intercepted data. See Kevin Poulsen, Carnivore Details Emerge, SECURITYFOCUS, Oct. 4,
2000. The use of DCS-1000 in practice highlights the very problem discussed in this
article it is increasingly technically difficult maybe impossible-to intercept only
targeted communications in a packet-based communications network. For example,
according to an internal FBI memo, technicians threw out lawfully collected wiretap
2006-2007
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Further, with the globalization of the telecommunications industry in
recent years and the dominance of U.S. infrastructure providers, a large
volume of international-to-international voice and email traffic is now
routed through switches in the United States. A voice call from Europe to
Asia, for example, may routinely go through a switch in the United States,
and much of the world's email traffic-even messages sent between
regionally neighboring states, say Pakistan and Sudan-may now pass
through switches in the United States.4 8 In addition, a significant amount of
web content and email is hosted on U.S.-based servers. The growth of this
'transit traffic' is problematic for foreign intelligence surveillance because
if FISA were to be applied strictly according to its terms prior to any
electronic surveillance of communication flows where the acquisition
occurs in the U.S. or there is a substantial likelihood of intercepting "U.S.
persons" communications (since domestic U.S. traffic transits the same
switches), then no electronic surveillance of any kind could occur anywhere
information from an investigation of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network when the DCS
application accidentally also intercepted and logged non-targeted communications. Memo:
FBI Destroyed Terrorism E-mails, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2002, at A16.
It has recently been alleged that because of these technical limitations the FBI is
now using a broader approach to lawful intercepts in which all traffic on a particular
network segment is collected and then the data is 'filtered' after the fact to extract those
messages subject to the particular warrant or court order. See Declan McCullagh, FBI
Turns to Broad New Wiretap Method, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 30, 2007. Applicable law and
policy simply must be updated to account for these technical realities and to incorporate
procedures that recognize that technical limitations require new methods to accomplish
appropriate and lawful uses.
Modern network diagnostic tools, such as the Narus STA 6400 semantic traffic
analyzer, give intelligence and law enforcement agencies powerful capabilities to monitor
communications network activity under appropriate circumstances. However, existing
laws and procedures, including those in FISA, are inadequate to accommodate technical
and operational needs for their lawful employ while still protecting privacy and civil
liberties.
48 It is rumored that it was a reluctance to disclose how much international traffic
transited U.S. switches, among other things, that dissuaded the administration from asking
Congress for amendments to FISA to address this particular problem and that then
ultimately led to the secret authorization of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales has stated that the Bush administration chose not to ask
Congress for an amendment to FISA to authorize such wiretaps explicitly because it would
have been difficult to get such an amendment without compromising classified information
relating to operational details. See White House Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National
Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/
20051219-1.html; and Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff and Attorney
General Gonzales on the USA PATRIOT Act (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech 0265.shtm.
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without a warrant and there is no procedure within FISA that would
accommodate this need.49
C. COLLATERAL INTERCEPTS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
Another problem-somewhat orthogonal to that presented by transit
intercepts-also arises when FISA is triggered by foreign intelligence
collection conducted against communications "to or from a person in the
United States" or against "U.S. persons" in these globalized communication
networks. Advances in information technology, the borderless nature of
terrorist threats, and global communications that may travel on random
paths across political borders has made place-of-collection and U.S.
personhood an increasingly unworkable basis for controlling the collection
of intelligence because it is in many cases no longer technically possible to
determine exactly when a communication is taking place "to or from the
United States" and no practical means exists to determine if a particular
participant is a U.S. person or not until after further investigation. 50  "In
49 See generally, RISEN, supra note 44 at 42-60 (discussing the perceived need to
circumvent FISA procedures); and see Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, supra note 4 1:
One issue of concern to the [FISC] . . .is whether the court has legal
authority over calls outside the United States that happen to pass through
American-based telephonic "switches" . .. "There was a lot of discussion
about the switches" . . . the gateways through which much of the
communications traffic flows.
The switches are some of the main arteries for moving voice and some
Internet traffic into and out of the United States, and, with the
globalization of the telecommunications industry in recent years, many
international-to-international calls are also routed through such American
switches.
The growth of that transit traffic had become a major issue for the
intelligence community, officials say, because it had not been fully
addressed by 1970's-era laws and regulations ... . Now that foreign calls
were being routed through switches on American soil, some judges and
law enforcement officials regarded eavesdropping on those calls as a
possible violation of those decades-old restrictions, including the [FISA],
which requires court-approved warrants for domestic surveillance.
But see note 61 infra (discussing the FISC orders and speculating about the use of
anticipatory warrants to 'pre-approve' certain collateral surveillance).
50 Place-of-collection and citizenship of persons involved in the communication are
increasingly arbitrary (in a technical sense) attributes of the intercepted communication,
that is, these attributes are not obviously apparent or discernable from the place of
interception or even from the communication itself. Publicly available intelligence
guidelines discussing traditional operational assumptions for example, that intercepts
abroad are assumed to not target U.S. persons and those within the United States are
seem outdated as well. That place of collection and U.S. person rules are increasingly
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fact, it is now difficult to tell where the domestic telephone system ends and
the international network begins." 51 FISA does not account for this.
Thus, where collateral U.S. person communications are intercepted
incidental to a legitimate foreign intelligence intercept, there is no explicit
way consistent with FISA as currently constituted to engage in follow up
electronic surveillance to determine if probable cause exists to target that
individual,52 even though the collateral intercept itself may give rise to a
constitutionally reasonable suspicion.
53
Communications of a U.S. person (including those to or from the
United States) acquired incidental to a lawful foreign interception would
generally be subject to collection, retention, and dissemination procedures
unworkable for information sharing is discussed in MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE THIRD REPORT, MOBILIZING INFORMATION TO
PREVENT TERRORISM: ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT OF A TRUSTED INFORMATION
SHARING ENVIRONMENT 32-41 (2006) (advocating replacing place of collection and U.S.
persons rules with an "authorized use" standard for information sharing).
51 RISEN, supra note 44 at 50. Note also that one can now acquire and use from
anywhere in the world a Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") telephone that has a local
telephone number assigned in any area or country code desired. Some Jihadist websites
specializing in countermeasure tradecraft have suggested acquiring VoIP telephones with
domestic U.S. telephone numbers precisely so as to make surveillance more difficult by
appearing to be domestic or U.S. person protected communications even though the
communication is in fact wholly foreign.
52 Although FISA permits applications for warrants to be made up to 72 hours after the
fact in certain limited emergency situations, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f), these procedures do not
address the collateral intercept problem discussed in this article or the TSP problem
discussed in note 42 supra because they impose the same a priori requirements, that is,
even in an 'emergency' situation FISA requires the Attorney General to determine before
approving the surveillance that the "factual basis for issuance of an order under [FISA] to
approve such surveillance exists," even in cases where additional investigation or
surveillance might be needed to determine such (or, in cases of incidental communications
to or from the U.S., where the communication itself could not be anticipated but triggers
FISA).
53 For an overview of the relevant Fourth Amendment probable cause and reasonable
suspicion standards, see Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and
Reasonableness Standards in the Context of the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (Jan. 30, 2006) ("... the [Supreme] Court has pointed out that
probable cause is the description of a degree of probability that cannot be easily defined out
of context." id. at CRS-2.) See also Hearing on Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) before the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Kim Taipale, Executive Director, Center for
Advanced Studies in Sci. & Tech. Pol'y) (hereinafter, "HPSCI Testimony") (discussing
general Fourth Amendment requirements at 7-10) ; Taipale, Frankenstein, supra note 7 at
202-17 ("Towards a Calculus of Reasonableness"); K. A. Taipale, Why Can't We All Get
Along? How Technology, Security, and Privacy can Co-exist in the Digital Age, in
CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 151, at 171-78 (Jack Balkin, et al.,
eds., 2007) (discussing reasonableness and due process).
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consistent with Executive Order 12,333. 54  While such information
ostensibly could be retained and disseminated according to intelligence
guidelines if it amounted to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, it
could not in practice be the basis for a FISA warrant application if its
foreign intelligence value was not apparent on its face (that is, if it required
follow up investigation, additional surveillance, or sharing with other
agencies for context) because it would be subject to minimization
procedures that would prevent its further retention or dissemination.
Further, if the collateral interception of a call to or from the U.S. occurred
from a switch in the United States while conducting lawful foreign
surveillance not otherwise subject to FISA, the incidental interception of
that communication itself could be considered to trigger statutory FISA
warrant requirements, thus, the collected information could not be used
even if it evidenced probable cause on its face unless the original
interception was somehow authorized.55
The problem is simply that FISA requirements are now being
triggered by unanticipated circumstances for communications that were not
originally intended to be subject to FISA (that is, those incidental to a
legitimate foreign target intercept) because, among other things, the
capability to do foreign intercepts from within the United States is now
technically feasible (and was not anticipated at the time FISA was enacted).
The untenable result in this particular case is that if the NSA were
lawfully targeting a foreign source communicating with someone in the
United States by monitoring a foreign switch, then that collateral
communication would not be subject to FISA and might subsequently be
used in support of an application for targeting the U.S. person or source.
However, if that same surveillance was being conducted at a switch in the
United States, any information from the collateral intercept could not be
used in any manner (including especially for an application for a FISA
warrant) if the incidental interception was deemed to have itself required a
FISA warrant (because it occurred in the United States). Indeed, it appears
that this specific "bootstrapping" problem was a particular concern of the
FISC.
56
Further, this problem could not simply be avoided by getting a FISA
warrant for the original interception because it is uncertain whether the
54 See note 15 supra and the referenced guideline documents.
55 See 50 U.S.C. §1801 (f) (2000): "Electronic surveillance means: ... (2) the
acquisition ... of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United
States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United
States. (emphasis added).
56 See Carol D. Leonnig, Surveillance Court is Seeking Answers, WASH. POST, Jan. 5,
2006, at A2 ("[the presiding FISC judge] had ... raised concerns ... about the risk that the
government could taint the integrity of the [FISC's] work by using information it gained
via wiretapping [pursuant to Presidential authority under the TSP] to obtain warrants ...
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.").
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FISC even has (or should have) jurisdiction 57 over the surveillance of a
purely foreign target and it could not be known a priori that a
communication to or from the U.S. would take place or with whom (thus, it
would be impossible in practice to meet the requirements to support a
traditional FISA warrant application). Obviously, even if there were FISC
jurisdiction, it would be impractical to obtain warrants covering all foreign
intelligence targets on the supposition that they might initiate or receive a
communication from within the United States.
58
As described in media reports, it appears that the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) was specifically intended to address a
particular aspect of the collateral intercept problem-that is, to authorize
surveillance of collateral communications to and from the U.S. intercepted
incidental to legitimate foreign surveillance activity without a FISA warrant
even where FISA statutory requirements might otherwise be triggered (for
example, where the interception was physically conducted at a U.S. switch
thus triggering § 1801(f)(2)). According to official statements, the TSP
authorized interception of international communications under presidential
authority where one party to the communication was a legitimate target of
foreign intelligence surveillance even if the other party was in the United
States or a U.S. person.5 9  Such surveillance previously authorized under
the TSP is now subject to the FISC orders:
I am writing to inform you that on January 10, 2007, a Judge of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued orders authorizing
the Government to target for collection international
communications into or out of the United States where there is
probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a
member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist
60
organization.
57 For a general discussion of the creation, membership, structure and jurisdiction of the
FISC and FISCR, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE U.S. FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW, (Congressional Research Service No.
RL33833, Jan. 24, 2007).
58 Note, however, that it may be precisely these circumstances that the FISC orders
address through use of "anticipatory" warrants. See note 61 infra.
59 Attorney General Gonzales has stated that: "the standard applied [in the NSA
Terrorist Surveillance Program under Presidential authority] 'reasonable basis to believe'
[that one party to the communication was 'terrorist'] is essentially the same as the
traditional Fourth Amendment probable cause standard." Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag speech 0601241.html, and, further,
specifically stated that the current FISC orders are based on "probable cause" to believe
that "one of the communicants is [a 'terrorist']." See Gonzales letter, supra note 2 and
Transcript, infra note 82.
60 Attorney General's letter, supra note 2.
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It is unlikely that the original TSP or the new FISC orders cover the entirety
of the collateral intercept problem discussed in this article, but, in any case,
FISA should be amended to provide an explicit statutory basis for these
orders.
61
D. AUTOMATED ANALYSIS: CONTENT FILTERING, TRAFFIC ANALYSIS,
AND LINK OR PATTERN ANALYSIS
62
Automated screening can monitor data flows to uncover terrorist
connections or terrorist communication channels without human
beings ever looking at anybody's emails or listening in on their
phone calls. Only when the computer identifies suspicious
connections or information do humans get involved.6 3
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore all the different
analysis techniques that can be applied to the automated monitoring of
terrorist communications but three generic examples show the range of
activity possible: content filtering, traffic analysis, and pattern or link
analysis.
Content filtering is used to search for the occurrence of particular
words or language combinations that may be indicative of particular
61 Details of the FISC orders have not been publicly disclosed and the Justice
Department has indicated that it is not prepared to release the orders to the public, see
Government's Supplemental Submission, supra note 9 at 20 ("the longstanding practice is
that FISA Court orders remain classified and not subject to public dissemination because,
among other things, publication of FISA Court orders would notify the enemy of our
targets and means of conducting surveillance"). Speculation about the nature of the FISC
orders has included discussion of whether they take the form of "anticipatory warrants"
that would authorize surveillance in the future if certain factual predicates were to occur.
Anticipatory warrants would require a judge to agree ahead of time that if certain facts
were to occur at some point in the future (for example, if a legitimate foreign target were to
communicate to or from the United States), then probable cause would exist at that time to
justify surveillance and electronic monitoring would be authorized and could be carried out
under the warrant. The use of anticipatory warrants was upheld in U.S. v. Grubbs, 126 S.
Ct. 1494, 1500 (2006) (warrant containing "triggering conditions" is constitutional).
Although the use of anticipatory warrants to authorize collateral intercepts in these
circumstances would mitigate some aspects of the collateral intercept problem discussed in
this article, an explicit statutory basis should be enacted to support such orders. On Feb.
27, 2007, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a Freedom of Information Act request
seeking release of Department of Justice records relating to the FISC orders. EFF v.
Department of Justice, No. 07-CV-00403 (D. D.C., filed Feb. 27, 2007).
62 Parts of this subsection are adapted from Taipale, Whispering Wires, supra note 43.
63 K. A. Taipale & James Jay Carafano, Fixing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance,
WASH. TiMEs, Jan. 25, 2006, at Al 5.
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communications (or persons) of interest. 64 A simple example of this would
be to screen for messages to or from known terrorist sources containing the
words "nuclear weapon" or "osama bin laden." Actual search algorithms
are, of course, much more complex and sophisticated and can employ
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and powerful statistical methods
such as Bayesian analysis to identify "signals of interest." It should be
made clear that the filtering contemplated here is not the same as undirected
"data mining" in which all communication flows are screened looking for
previously unknown general indicia of suspicion with no starting point.
65
Traffic analysis is the observation of traffic patterns-message
lengths, frequency, paths, etc.-of communications without examining the
content of the message (traffic analysis can be used even where content is
encrypted).66  Traffic analysis can reveal patterns of organization, for
example, by measuring "betweeness" in email traffic67  or other
communications among known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
communication channels or networks. By looking for patterns in traffic
these techniques, together with analytical methods such as social network
theory, can identify organizations or groups and the key people in them.
68
64 For example, the Echelon program has been described as an NSA program (in
partnership with corresponding agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK)
to automatically filter and sort intercepted foreign communications using "dictionaries"
consisting of targeted keywords names, addresses, telephone numbers, IP addresses,
aliases, affiliates, etc. for different categories of targets. PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE,
CHATTER 116 (2006). The existence of Echelon has not been officially acknowledged and
the details of the program are classified. However, most public accounts describe a process
in which communications are flagged by certain keywords. See, e.g., Federation of
American Scientists Web Site, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/echelon.htm;
European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System,
Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial
Communications (ECHELON Interception System) (2001/2098-NI) (Jul. 11, 2001). And,
see U.S. Patent 6,169,969 for a "device and method for full-text large dictionary string
matching" discussed in Keefe, supra at 121-22.
65 See discussion of link and pattern analysis below.
66 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 34-35 (2000) ("Traffic analysis is the study of communication patterns ... [o]ften
the patterns of communication are just as important as the contents of communications").
67 Links with high "betweenness" are those infrequently used links that connect groups
from two distinct communities of frequently connected individuals. See generally Linton
C. Freeman. A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, 40 SOCIOMETRY, Mar.
1977, at 35 41.
68 Covert social networks exhibit certain characteristics that can be identified. Post hoc
analysis of the 9/11 terror network shows that these relational networks exist and can be
identified, at least after the fact. Vladis E. Krebs, Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, 7 FIRST
MONDAY, April 2002 (mapping and analyzing the relational network among the 9/11
hijackers). Research on mafia and drug smuggling networks show characteristics particular
to each kind of organization, and current social network research in counterterrorism is
focused on identifying unique characteristics of terror networks. See generally Philip Vos
Fellman & Roxana Wright, Modeling Terrorist Aetworks: Complex Systems at the Mid-
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These methods can uncover how terrorist groups are organized and reveal
activity even if they are communicating in code or only discussing the
weather.
69
Link or pattern analysis in this context is the use of observed or
hypothesized connections or patterns to find other related but unknown
relationships. Again, it is important to distinguish undirected "data mining"
for general patterns of suspicion from the targeted use of pattern matching
to allocate investigative resources being discussed here.
70
For example, known patterns of terrorist communications can be
identified and used to uncover other unknown but indirectly related
terrorists. Thus, for instance, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the FBI
determined that the leaders of the nineteen hijackers had made 206
international telephone calls to locations in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Germany. 71  It is believed that in order to determine whether any other
Range, presented at Complexity, Ethics and Creativity Conference, London School of
Economics (Sep. 17-18 2003); Joerg Raab & H. Briton Milward, Dark Networks as
Problems, 13 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413-39 (2003); Matthew Dombroski et
al., Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INT'L COMMAND
AND CONTROL RES. AND TECH. SYMPOSIUM (2003); H. Brinton Milward & Joerg Raab,
Dark Aetworks as Problems Revisited: Adaptation and Transformation of Islamic Terror
Organizations since 9111, presented at the 8th Publ. Mgt. Res. Conference at the School of
Policy, Planning and Development at University of Southern California, Los Angeles (Sep.
29-Oct. 1, 2005); D. B. Skillicorn, Social Network Analysis Via Matrix Decomposition, in
EMERGENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND ENABLING POLICIES FOR COUNTER
TERRORISM (Robert Popp and John Yen, eds., Jun. 2006). For a general overview of global
Salafi jihadist terror networks, see Marc Sageman, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS
(2004).
69 See, e.g., Hazel Muir, Email Traffic Patterns can Reveal Ringleaders, NEW
SCIENTIST, Mar. 27, 2003. For a general discussion of the use of social network theory in
counterterrorism analysis, see Patrick Radden Keefe, Can Network Theory Thwart
Terrorists?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 12, 2006, at 16.
70 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss general data mining issues in greater
detail. For a detailed discussion of these and related issues, see K. A. Taipale, Data Mining
and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCl. &
TECH. L. REV. 2 (2003) (hereinafter, Connecting the Dots). For a detailed rebuttal of
popular arguments against the potential usefulness of data mining for counterterrorism
applications, see Hearing on Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of
Government Data Mining Programs before U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 110th Cong.,
at 6-16 (Jan. 10, 2007) (testimony of Kim Taipale, Executive Director, Center for
Advanced Studies in Sci. & Tech. Pol'y) ("Popular arguments about why [data mining]
won't work for counterterrorism are simply wrong . . . the commercial analogy is
irrelevant, the 'training set' problem is a red herring, and the false positive problem can be
significantly reduced by using appropriate architectures and, in any case, is not unique to
data mining.").
71 John Crewdson, Germany says 911 hijackers called Syria, Saudi Arabia, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 8, 2006, at C17 ("According to [a classified report based on telephone records
obtained from the FBI], 206 international telephone calls were known to have been made
by the leaders of the hijacking plot after they arrived in the United States including 29 to
Germany, 32 to Saudi Arabia and 66 to Syria.").
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unknown persons-so-called sleeper cells-in the United States might have
been in communication with the same pattern of foreign phone numbers
72
the NSA analyzed Call Data Records (CDRs) of international and domestic
phone calls obtained from the major telecommunication companies. 73
Undertaking such an analysis seems reasonable, particularly in the
circumstances immediately following 9/11, yet, FISA and existing
procedures do not provided an authorizing mechanism for determining such
reasonableness because FISA simply did not contemplate the need for
approval of specific-but not individualized-pattern-based data searches
or surveillance. 4
It is important to point out again that the kind of automated analysis
being discussed in this section is not the undirected "data mining" to look
for general indicia of "suspicious behavior" that rightly has libertarians
75
72 That is, to uncover others who may not have a direct connection to the nineteen
known hijackers but who may exhibit the same or similar patterns of communication as the
known hijackers.
73 That the NSA obtained CDRs from U.S. telecommunication carriers for analysis was
implied in Lichtblau, supra note 41, and was explicitly alleged in Cauley, supra note 2.
74 FISA specifically includes procedures for use of so-called pen register or trap and
trace devices to record addressing details from phone conversations under a lower standard
than that required for content interception (i.e., lower than that required for "wiretaps"), 50
U.S.C. § 1842 (2000), however, it provides no mechanism for authorizing searches for
specific traffic information from general databases.
It is settled law under Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that addressing
information is generally entitled to lesser constitutional protection than communication
content. See generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PHONE
CALLING ACTIVITY AND RELATED RECORDS: LEGAL AUTHORITIES 3-5, (Congressional
Research Service Report to Congress No. RL33424, 2007). Further, the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not impose an irreducible requirement of
individualized suspicion before a search can be found reasonable, or even to procure a
warrant. In at least six cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of drug courier profiles
as the basis to stop and subject individuals to further investigative actions, including
search. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Steven K. Bernstein,
Fourth Amendment: Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996 (1990). More relevant, the court in United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), upheld the validity of hijacker behavior
profiling, opining that "in effect ... [the profiling] system itself ... acts as informer" serving
as sufficient constitutional basis for initiating further investigative actions. Yet, FISA
simply provides no mechanism to address the need for authorization in the described
circumstances.
75 See, e.g., Hearing on Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of
Government Data Mining Programs before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2007) (testimony of Robert Barr, Chief Executive Officer, Liberty
Strategies, LLC); and Hearing on Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy
Implications of Government Data Mining Programs before the U.S. Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 1 10th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2007) (testimony of Jim Harper, Director of
Information Policy Studies, The Cato Institute).
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and civil libertarians 76 concerned about fishing expeditions or general
searches to examine all communication flows in the manner of a general
warrant. 77 These automated monitoring technologies should not be
employed as a general method for "finding terrorists" by screening all
global communications with no starting point, nor should they be used for
determining guilt or innocence. 78  Rather, they should be employed
carefully-subject to appropriate authorizations and effective oversight-as
powerful tools to help better allocate law enforcement and security
resources to more likely targets.79 As such, automated analysis is simply
76 See, e.g., Hearing on Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of
Government Data Mining Programs before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 110th
Cong. (Jan. 10, 2007) (statement of Leslie Harris, Executive Director, Center for
Democracy & Technology); see JAY STANLEY & BARRY STEINHARDT, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, BIGGER MONSTER, WEAKER CHAINS: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 11-12, (2003).
77 See, e.g., Taipale, HPSCI Testimony, supra note 53 at 5-6 ("Programs of surveillance
are not general warrants"). It was the use of general warrants by the English that led in part
to the American Revolution, see, e.g., O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of
the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-75 (Richard Morris ed.,
1939), and to enactment of the Fourth Amendment, see EDWARD CORWIN, THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY at 341 (1978, 1920); DAVID HUTCHINSON,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION at 294-95 (1975, 1928); and NELSON B.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION at 51-105 (1937).
78 See Connecting the Dots, supra note 70 at 19; and Paul Rosenzweig, Proposals for
Implementing the Terrorism Information Awareness System, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
169, 190 (2004) (discussing the appropriate consequences of pattern-based identification).
79 One of the criticisms of using predictive risk management techniques for
counterterrorism is to suggest that these methods may cast a wide net of "suspicion" and
that many of these "suspects" will be innocent. See, e.g., Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note
76 at 12; JEFF JONAS & JIM HARPER, CATO INSTITUTE, EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM
AND THE LIMITED ROLE OF PREDICTIVE DATA MINING 7 (December 11, 2006) (for a
detailed critique of the many inductive fallacies in the Cato Institute paper, see Testimony,
supra note 70). But such an assumption is not uncritically warranted as these simplistic
arguments confuse the use of probability-based resource allocation for investigative
purposes with the assignment or determination of guilt (that is, they confuse attention with
a determinative inference of "suspicion").
For example, in the ordinary course of law enforcement, the use of statistical or
trend analysis to assign resources say more beat officers to a high crime neighborhood
does not automatically lead to the inference that everybody in that neighborhood is a
suspect, only that assigning resources there may be more effective than assigning them
elsewhere. So, too, in counterterrorism, computational analytic tools can help allocate
intelligence and law enforcement resources more effectively so long as care is taken to
design policy and systems to avoid automatically triggering adverse consequences such
as determining guilt or innocence or otherwise denying rights without adequate
opportunities for error correction and redress. See also K. A. Taipale, The Trusted Systems
Problem: Security Envelopes, Statistical Threat Analysis, and the Presumption of
Innocence, 20 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 80 83("[I]t is the probative
value of the [analysis], rather than its probabilistic nature, that is relevant in determining
2006-2007
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the computational automation of traditional investigative procedures:
monitoring known or suspected terrorists, following links from these
suspects, or looking for specific patterns of operations or behaviors (i.e.,
observing and anticipating modus operandi).
FISA as currently constituted is unworkable in the context of
globalized communications networks and advanced technical methods for
gathering intelligence because it provides no mechanisms to adequately
address the authorization and oversight of transit intercepts, collateral
intercepts, and the use of automated monitoring. Simply to insist that these
problems be ignored and that FISA is adequate "as is" is to engage in
policy-making in a dangerous state of denial reminiscent of King Ludd. 80
Likewise, seeking solution only in streamlining cumbersome procedures 8 1 is
to address symptoms, not root causes. Nor is it appropriate as a matter of
public policy to resolve the deficiencies through "innovative"
interpretations of existing FISA provisions, particularly when such
outcomes are negotiated in secret and enacted through undisclosed FISC
orders.82 What is needed, in my view, is a rethinking of foreign intelligence
whether it is a sufficient predicate for government action. To argue otherwise is to confuse
the presumption of innocence with the probability of innocence." id. at 82).
80 See Taipale, Frankenstein, at 126-27, 220-21 (arguing that the lesson to be drawn
from the experience of the luddites is that simple opposition to technological change is
doomed to failure and therefore adaptation is a better policy).
81 For example, as proposed in the Lawful Intelligence and Surveillance of Terrorists in
an Emergency by NSA Act ("LISTEN Act"), H.R. 5371, 109th Cong. (2006) (the Harman-
Conyers bill) (providing tools to expedite emergency warrant applications and authorizing
funds to incorporate standardization, electronic filing and streamlined review procedures at
the NSA and DOJ for FISA warrant applications). These provisions are both laudable and
necessary but not alone sufficient. However, such procedural improvements should be
included in any future legislation that also addresses the substantive failings of FISA as
discussed in this article.
82 The Attorney General has described the FISC orders as "innovative" and "complex"
requiring two years of negotiations between the administration and the FISC:
These orders are innovative, they are complex, and it took considerable
time and work for the Government to develop the approach that was
proposed to the Court and for the judge on the FISC to consider and
approve these orders.
Letter of the Attorney General, supra note 2. And, in a background briefing by two "senior
Justice Department officials":
These orders, however, are orders that have taken a long time to put
together, to work on. They're orders that take advantage of use of the use
of the FISA statute and developments in the law. I can't really get into
developments in the law before the FISA court. But it's a process that
began nearly two years ago, and it's just now that the court has approved
these orders.
Transcript of Background Briefing by Senior Justice Department Officials on FISA
Authority of Electronic Surveillance (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/ 01/dojO I1707.html.
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surveillance that takes into account the changed security and technology
context and a careful updating and amending of FISA and related
procedures to specifically meet these challenges-including, if appropriate,
an explicit statutory basis for the existing FISC orders-while still
upholding core constitutional principles.
83
IV. FIXING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
To address the deficiencies identified in the previous section, FISA
should be amended to provide for:
1. explicit authority or programmatic pre-approval8 4 without requiring
individual warrants for transit intercepts, that is, intercepts "at the
But, "[t]he legality of this ... surveillance program should not be decided by a secret
court in one-sided proceedings." Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU
Demands More Information on "Innovative" Orders Issued by Secret Court, (Jan. 17,
2007). For speculation about the nature of the FISC orders, see note 61 supra.
83 Despite the issuance of the FISC orders now authorizing surveillance previously
authorized under the TSP, the administration also still believes that FISA needs updating:
[W]e in the administration continue to believe that Congress should enact
FISA reform legislation to modernize FISA statute to reestablish what we
think is the proper, original focus of FISA on the domestic
communications of U.S. persons. We believe that debate should continue
to happen, that Congress should consider modernizing FISA very quickly
in the new Congress.
Transcript, supra note 82.
84 It is beyond the scope of this article to recommend particular mechanisms or
standards for authorizing programmatic or other approvals. It has been argued that courts
are ill-suited, and may be constitutionally prohibited, from such an oversight role, see, e.g.,
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Commentary: Inherent Authority, WALL ST. J., Feb.
8, 2006, at A16 ("The federal courts can only adjudicate actual cases and controversies;
they cannot offer advisory opinions"), and that a statutory executive or legislative
authorization or oversight body should be created. Compare, for example, the proposed
Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006) (the DeWine bill) that
would approve the Terrorist Surveillance Program subject to oversight by special
Congressional committees with the proposed National Security Surveillance Act of 2006,
S. 3876, 109th Cong. (2006) (the Specter bill) that would require FISA court (FISC)
approval and oversight, including review every forty-five days to continue "electronic
surveillance programs." See also, Taipale, HPSC1 Testimony, supra note 53 at 10-12
(discussing the pros-and-cons of judicial versus legislative involvement); and see John
Schmidt, Together Against Terror, LEGALTIMES, Jan. 15, 2007 (arguing persuasively for a
legal structure that involves the courts in order to foster the necessary confidence in the
legality of the surveillance activity). Cf Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R.
5825, 109th Cong. (2006) (the Wilson bill) (passed by the House on Sep. 28, 2006 and
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (requiring Congressional oversight but
allow submission of the TSP to the FISC for review).
Although the exact scope of the current FISC orders has not been disclosed, the
administration has denied that they are "programmatic" in the advisory sense:
2006-2007
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switch" aimed at foreign communications but that might currently
trigger statutory FISA warrant requirements 85 because the acquisition
"occurs in the U.S." (or elsewhere with the "likelihood that the
surveillance will [also] acquire the contents of any communication to
which a United States person is a party"),
2. programmatic pre-approval 86 without requiring individual warrants of
automated analysis and monitoring methods, including targeted content
filtering, traffic analysis, and link or pattern analysis in specific contexts
where the initial target or channel is a legitimate foreign intelligence
target but the surveillance takes place within the U.S. or there is a
likelihood of intercepting U.S. persons, 87 and
3. the statutory equivalent of a Terry stop 88 to permit limited follow up
electronic surveillance of suspicious communications, including those
involving U.S. persons, collaterally intercepted incidental to an
authorized surveillance (including incidental to those authorized through
programmatic approval under (1) and (2) above).
I will say that these are not these orders are not some sort of advisory
opinion ruling on the program as a whole. These are orders that comply
with the terms and requirements of the FISA statute, just like other orders
issued by the FISA court.
Transcript, supra note 82. Thus, it has been speculated that the orders are more in the
nature of anticipatory warrants, see note 61 supra, that authorize surveillance when or if
certain circumstantial facts that would amount to probable cause occur in the future. See,
e.g., How Do Innovative Spy Warrants Work? One Expert Speculates, WIRED News, Jan.
22, 2007, at 27B.
85 Note that these are statutory warrant requirements, not Constitutionally requirements.
See Taipale, HPSCI Testimony, supra note 53 at 8-9 (discussing warrant requirements). As
discussed in note 15 supra, even under the stricter standard of Title III, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that warrantless interceptions collateral to a lawful intercept are not
violations of the Fourth Amendment.
86 See supra note 84.
87 Note that under some intelligence collection guidelines, electronic data is generally
not considered "collected" until it has been processed into intelligible form. See, e.g.,
Department of Defense Directive 5240.1-R Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD
Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons at 15 §C2.2.1 (1982). Thus, bringing
automated analysis under a statutory scheme might actually provide more oversight for
some activity than under current guidelines.
88 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a police officer may stop an individual
on the basis of "reasonable suspicion" and conduct a limited follow up search prior to
establishing probable cause).
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It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the related
constitutional jurisprudence in detail. 89  However, there is likely no
constitutional prohibition to a carefully crafted legislative solution that
would statutorily authorize programmatic approval of electronic
surveillance programs for foreign intelligence purposes that (i) target
foreign communications transiting the U.S. or (ii) use automated analysis or
monitoring methods, and which would also authorize limited follow-up
investigation or surveillance based on reasonable suspicion of U.S. persons
initially identified through collateral intercepts in order to determine if
probable cause sufficient to meet FISA requirements for a warrant could be
established. 90
Further, permitting such programs may actually be preferable-and,
ultimately, less intrusive to civil liberties-than alternative methods, for
example, requiring physical surveillance to independently establish
probable cause following a determination of reasonable suspicion incidental
to a legitimate foreign intelligence intercept.
What is needed is an explicit statutory mechanism, incorporating the
necessary democratic checks-and-balances, for programmatic approval of
transit intercepts and automated analysis targeted against known or
reasonably suspected foreign terrorist communication sources-that is,
against legitimate foreign intelligence targets normally not subject to FISA
and normally not requiring a warrant-even where such surveillance or
technical methods may "occur in the United States" or where there is a
likelihood of intercepting U.S. persons communications. If the initial
process identifies potentially suspicious connections to or from legitimate
foreign intelligence targets-including, for example, U.S. persons or
89 For a detailed discussion of the Constitutional issues involved, see references in note
53 supra; and RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
90 Note that with regard to the TSP, Attorney General Gonzales has stated that: "the
standard applied 'reasonable basis to believe' is essentially the same as the traditional
Fourth Amendment probable cause standard." Gonzales, supra note 59. And, further, that
the current FISC orders are based on "probable cause." See Gonzales letter, supra note 2
and Transcript, supra note 82. For an overview of the Fourth Amendment probable cause
and reasonable suspicion standards, see Congressional Research Service Memorandum to
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, supra note 53 at CRS-2 ("... the [Supreme]
Court has pointed out that probable cause is the description of a degree of probability that
cannot be easily defined out of context.").
Thus, there are two related issues involved here: first, whether there are actually two
standards reasonable suspicion and probable cause; and, second, who a FISC judge
following lengthy a priori FISA procedures (or ad hoc anticipatory procedures, see note 61
supra) or a "shift-supervisor" [senior intelligence officer] at the NSA in "hot pursuit" of an
intercepted communication makes the determination. A statutory Terry-like procedure
would address both by leaving some discretion with the "officer on the scene" (consistent
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sources communicating with known or suspected terrorists or through
known or suspected terrorist communication channels-then some
additional appropriately authorized monitoring or follow-up investigation
(including technical analysis, monitoring, or additional circumscribed
electronic surveillance) should be permitted in order to determine if that
initial "reasonable suspicion" is justified.91
91 Incidental intercepts of U.S. person data are subject to minimization procedures that
in practice restrict effective use of such collateral information unless it has foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence (or in some cases, criminal intelligence) value on its
face. Use, retention or dissemination of such information is restricted by minimization
guidelines for example, by blocking out the name or phone number of U.S. persons (see,
e.g., USSID 18 §6(b): "may be disseminated ... if the identity of the United States person
is deleted and a generic term or symbol substituted so that the information cannot
reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person") in a way that does
not, in practice, permit it to be used to develop independent probable cause to target that
U.S. person, particularly where its foreign intelligence value would only be apparent upon
follow up investigation or dissemination. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h) (2000); see note 15 supra
(Executive Order 12,333 and related guideline documents). (Prior to 9/11 such information
was not even routinely shared with other government agencies and, in keeping with
Attorney General guidelines, could not even be shared in practice within the FBI itself
between the intelligence division and the criminal division. See Attorney General Janet
Reno, Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (Jul. 19, 1995). This
latter problem was subsequently addressed in the Mar. 6, 2002 Attorney General
guidelines, Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI.) And, as discussed in Section III
(B) & (C) supra, in cases where the collateral intercept itself triggers FISA (because it
"occurs in the United States," for example) such information cannot subsequently be used
at all unless the original interception is specifically authorized. Indeed, it appears that
concern specifically over the use of information from the TSP intercepts to establish
probable cause for subsequent FISA warrant applications may have led to a three week
suspension of the TSP in 2004. See Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court's Judges Were Warned
About NSA Spy Data, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006. Thus, another way to deal with this
particular aspect of the collateral intercept problem would be to change the statutory
minimization procedures to explicitly permit some limited follow-up investigation or
surveillance (along the lines suggested above under the Terry stop equivalent) and to
explicitly sanction the use of information gleaned during this period (or otherwise collateral
to a programmatic intercept) for subsequent warrant applications.
It should be noted that Attorney General Gonzales in his testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Jan. 17, 2007 specifically mentioned that the FISC orders include
minimization procedures "above and beyond" those typically required under the law.
Thus, it can be speculated that through a combination of anticipatory warrants (see note 61
supra) and enhanced minimization procedures, the administration and the FISC (or at least
one judge of the FISC) were able to agree a procedure that authorizes collateral intercepts
and permits information from those intercepts to act as predicate for limited targeting of
international communications. Information collected pursuant to those orders could then
presumably serve as the basis for requesting a 'normal' FISA warrant to target the domestic
end or U.S. person should probable cause be established (indeed, the predicate for such
targeting may have been already been predetermined as part of the "anticipatory warrants,"
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The problem with FISA is that it contemplates only a single binary a
priori threshold for authorizing any electronic interception within the U.S.
or involving U.S. persons - probable cause that the target is an agent of a
foreign power.92  Unfortunately, even extensive contact with a known
terrorist may not be procedurally sufficient to satisfy the current
requirements for a FISA warrant, yet such contact may have significant
"foreign intelligence value" requiring follow up investigation (and would
also meet the constitutional requirement of reasonableness).
Thus, what is needed, in my view, is a statutory basis for the
electronic surveillance equivalent of a Terry stop, the constitutionally
permissible procedure under which a police officer can briefly detain
someone for questioning and conduct a limited pat-down search if they have
'reasonable suspicion' to believe that the person may be involved in a
crime. 93  In the case of electronic surveillance, this would permit a
circumscribed but authorized procedure for follow-up monitoring or
investigation of initial suspicion derived from automated monitoring (or
otherwise developed collateral to a legitimate foreign intelligence intercept).
If ongoing suspicion is not justified on follow-up analysis or
surveillance, monitoring would be discontinued and normal (or enhanced 94)
minimization procedures would be triggered; however, if suspicion is
reasonably justified then monitoring could continue under the programmatic
approval for some limited further period to determine if standard statutory
probable cause can be established. If there is probable cause to suspect that
the target is actively engaged in terrorism or is an "agent" of a foreign
see note 61 supra). Again, the point of this article is to argue that FISA should be amended
to provide an explicit statutory basis for these orders (or their equivalents).
92 Assuming that the current FISC orders conform to the speculation regarding
"anticipatory warrants," see note 61 supra, then what the administration and the FISC seem
to have done is to have agreed a set of future factual circumstances that would amount to
probable cause if(or when) they were to occur that is, to anticipate that communications
to or from a person in the United States with a legitimate foreign target may occur and to
"pre-authorize" surveillance of those communications should they actually occur. While
such a process might be shoehorned within the spirit and convoluted language of FISA, it
would certainly have greater legitimacy-that is, a greater claim to be recognized as right
and just, see generally Jurgen Habermas, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
SOCIETY 178 (1976) (discussing "legitimacy") if it were subject to explicit statutory
authority and procedures. See also Schmidt, supra note 84 (arguing for legislation to
explicitly extend the FISC jurisdiction to allow programmatic approval).
93 See Taipale, Whispering Wires, supra note 43 (discussing the "electronic surveillance
equivalent of a Terry stop").
94 Normal minimization procedures are intended to limit retention or use of incidentally
acquired U.S. person information without foreign intelligence value. A statutory regime
that would permit collateral intercepts and sanction the use of collaterally collected
information subject to programmatic approvals to establish independent predicate for
additional warrants might require enhanced minimization procedures to isolate analysis and
manage disposition of collateral information. As discussed in note 91 supra, it appears that
the FISC orders include enhanced minimization procedures.
2006-2007
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terrorist group, then a regular FISA warrant would be sought to target that
U.S. person or source for full surveillance.
Based on published reports and public statements by intelligence
officials responsible for the Terrorist Surveillance Program it is my belief
that this indeed describes generally the procedures that the TSP was
following,95 and that are currently being authorized under the FISC orders.
96
CONCLUSION
What is needed, then, is to provide a statutory mechanism that
involves congressional authorization and oversight, together with an explicit
statutory basis for judicial orders and review, so that legitimate foreign
intelligence requirements can be met without resorting to unilateral secret
executive branch approvals or by shoehorning "innovative" solutions not
explicitly anticipated under FISA. Regardless of whether the President
indeed currently has statutory or inherent authority to approve such
programs, or whether a FISC judge can be convinced to stretch FISA to
cover certain needs, our system of government works best, and public
confidence is best maintained, only when the three branches of government
work together in consensus and the broad parameters of procedural
protections are publicly debated and agreed. Further, the ability of our
government to respond appropriately to emergent national security threats is
too important to be wholly dependant on the negotiation of ad hoc
procedures during times of crises.
The central issue regarding foreign intelligence surveillance in
modern communication systems is under what conditions information
derived from collateral intercepts from legitimate surveillance of foreign
intelligence targets or through automated monitoring can itself provide the
reasonable predicate to allocate additional investigative resources for follow
up investigation or surveillance even when it involves "U.S. persons" or
when the communication takes place within the United States. FISA
currently provides no workable mechanism for addressing these
circumstances and should be amended.
95 See, e.g., Remarks by Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director Of
National Intelligence and Former Director of the National Security Agency, Address To
The National Press Club: What American Intelligence & Especially The NSA Have Been
Doing To Defend The Nation, National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2006).
(Gen. Hayden was subsequently appointed Director of Central Intelligence on May 8,
2006, confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2006, and sworn in May 30, 2006).
96 See generally notes 2, 42, 61,82, 84, 90, 91, and 92 supra.
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